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Abstract 
Adaptation priorities are usually identified based on the results of top-down impacts-based 
assessments that may fail to represent the true social nature of vulnerability to climate change. This 
paper reviews recent studies to highlight the social nature of vulnerability and to consider the ways in 
which adaptation may or may not protect the most vulnerable. It identifies a ‘quadruple injustice’ of 
climate change: that certain social groups emit the least, may be negatively affected by mitigation 
policies, are most vulnerable to climate impacts and may be negatively affected by adaptation 
measures. The paper considers whether public attitudes towards fairness might be invoked to address 
this injustice by supporting new governance arrangements that transfer resources from high emitters 
to the most vulnerable. 
Intro 
In recent years research and policy have begun to focus on the need to adapt to inevitable climate 
change. This requires decision makers at a range of scales (global to local, sectoral, etc.) to assess the 
likely impacts of climate change in order to identify priorities for adaptation (Brown et al, 2011). To 
date, few adaptation assessments have considered the uneven distribution of climate impacts and 
vulnerability across groups and individuals within society. This is partly a result of the tools and 
methods that are used to inform adaptation policy. Another reason is that the task of assessing 
individuals’ and groups’ vulnerability to future change is highly complex, given large uncertainties 
about the direction and pace of future socio-economic and climatic trends and events. This makes it 
difficult to say with certainty which groups or individuals are ‘most’ vulnerable. Here vulnerability to 
climate change, climate variability and extreme events is defined as a function of exposure to climate 
impacts, sensitivity to those impacts and the adaptive capacity of the people or systems impacted 
(following Blaikie et al, 1994; IPCC, 2007).  
This paper takes as a premise that society should and does care about social justice as a core value. It 
also takes the perspective that when assessing the impacts of climate change, the focus should be on 
who suffers, how much, when and how, and that adaptation should aim to be equitable as well as 
effective, efficient  and legitimate (after Adger et al, 2005). Adaptation should therefore strive to be 
socially just and to protect those who are most vulnerable to climate impacts.  
This paper begins by briefly considering the types of research and methodologies that have been 
used to support adaptation decision making. It then focuses on how social justice issues relate to 
climate change by drawing on recent studies on the distribution of household emissions, the social 
nature of vulnerability to climate impacts and the potential for adaptation to reduce or even increase 
the vulnerability of the most vulnerable. The paper concludes that there is a strong injustice 
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surrounding climate change and adaptation, even within developed countries such as the UK; the 
paper identifies what it calls the ‘quadruple injustice of climate change’ and briefly discusses some of 
the implications for the governance of adaptation.  
Adaptation research and methods 
Adaptation outcomes will only be as good as the methods and evidence used to inform adaptation 
decisions. Adaptation decision support methods include climate science, risk assessment, economic 
analyses and vulnerability assessment. A very brief overview of these methods and their potential for 
capturing social issues is given below.  
Climate science 
Decision makers take adaptation seriously because of the messages provided by climate science. 
Various general circulation models are used to project scenarios of future climate, which can be 
downscaled to model local level impacts (e.g. precipitation, run-off, flooding, etc.). Information of 
this type can be used to assess the likelihood and severity of future changes in climate and thereby 
identify priorities for adaptation. Methodologies based on this kind of top-down approach can 
loosely be termed ‘impacts-based’ (see Brown et al, 2011).  
Impacts-based approaches tend to focus on physical and natural systems rather than social systems. 
This is because the drivers and mechanics of these systems are better known and already modelled 
to some extent in most cases. Models of the impacts of climate change on hydrology (including 
flooding) and coastal change are therefore fairly common (HR Wallingford, 2012); new models of 
physical systems (e.g. urban heat islands) are emerging (e.g. Hoffman et al, 2011). 
Social systems are highly complex and are rarely modelled as such. Human actors respond to a range 
of stimuli in often irrational and highly context-specific ways, which makes it difficult to simulate 
human decisions at the societal scale in models (Goldspink, 2000). For example, it is more difficult to 
model how an individual will respond to a flood than it is to model how a river system will respond to 
heavy rain. The result is that science-led, impacts-based approaches fail to represent the social 
nature of climate impacts.  
Risk assessment 
Climate science and impacts model results can be used in a variety of ways to support actual 
decisions. One of the most commonly advocated methods to support adaptation is to follow a risk 
management framework (Willows & Connell, 2003; Jones & Preston, 2010). Risk management is 
particularly appropriate because of the pervasive uncertainty involved with adaptation decisions.  
One way to undertake a climate risk assessment is to identify a long list of potential impacts and then 
to scientifically assess their likelihood and magnitude in order to identify a level of risk (Brown et al, 
2011). This sort of risk assessment can be seen as a continuation of an impacts-based approach to 
adaptation decision making. It implies that there is a value-neutral or scientific measurement of risk. 
An alternative approach is objective-based risk identification (Institute of Risk Management, 2002). 
This involves the assessment of a number of possible ‘risk drivers’ on the cost or potential for 
achieving an explicit set of objectives. This sort of approach is more common in project or corporate 
risk assessment. It is equally applicable to policy-based organisations or governments, however. It 
requires the decision maker to be explicit about their objectives, which often involves making 
normative choices of about what is most important or what ‘should’ be achieved. Supposedly neutral 
policy makers are often reluctant to specify their objectives, especially where these may be policy-
sensitive and therefore change over time. It is sometimes considered ‘safer’ not to state normative 
preferences and base adaptation decision making on some value-free, ‘scientific’ (impacts-based) 
approach. Bradbury (1989) argues that risk management is better when it is based on openly 
subjective preferences about what is important to society. If a policy maker can be explicit about 
their objective to, for example, improve the quality of life for all citizens, or to reduce social 
inequalities, then objective-based risk assessments hold significant potential for capturing the social 
nature of climate impacts, risks and vulnerability.  
Economic analyses 
Adaptation decisions can also be supported by economic analyses, including social or project cost 
benefit analysis (CBA) and, at the global scale, integrated assessment modelling (IAM). The objective 
of these tools is to identify efficient or optimal policy choices, not to consider equity as a priority 
criterion. 
 Information on the costs of climate impacts and the benefits of adaptation are limited for most 
impacts and in most sectors (Watkiss, 2011). However, investment decisions need to be informed by 
analysis of available options and in some instances, where investment costs and the value of avoided 
damages can be relatively well understood (e.g. for physical flood defences), CBA is an important and 
effective decision support tool. Social CBA seeks to maximise welfare from a utilitarian perspective, 
meaning that there might be winners and losers from an investment, but it will remain attractive as 
long as the winners are able to compensate the losers and still be better off. However, the 
distribution of the costs and (dis)benefits from social CBA for adaptation rarely receive much 
attention and the treatment of time preference in CBA via discount rates also raises questions of 
inter-generational justice according to the view of some critics (e.g. Ackerman, 2009). Similarly, the 
use of IAMs to inform decisions on adaptation policy design fails to shed light on social inequality or 
justice issues and may overestimate society’s ability to adapt because of the crude representation of 
adaptation decisions in such models (see Stanton et al, 2009; Patt et al, 2009). Economic analyses, 
whilst important in many respects, therefore fail to adequately account for the distribution of climate 
impacts across society.  
The use of impacts-based approaches can be generally characterised as ‘top-down’ (Dessai & Hulme, 
2004). Top-down approaches focus on exposure to harm as a result of their basis in climate scenarios 
and tend to see vulnerability as an ‘end-point’ (Kelly & Adger, 2000) or an ‘outcome’ (O’Brien et al, 
2007) – sometimes considering the impacts that would remain after adaptation had occurred – and 
therefore static, as opposed to part of a social process. Top-down approaches, including relatively 
high resolution maps or indicators, can also imply that vulnerability is heterogeneous across groups 
or places, which may be inaccurate and stigmatise certain people or places as being ‘high risk’ 
(Benzie et al, 2010). An advantage of top-down assessments is that they can generally be carried out 
for a large geographical area, for example across a country, or indeed globally. 
Vulnerability assessment 
 ‘Bottom-up’ approaches, also known as vulnerability-based assessments, on the other hand, tend to 
understand vulnerability by focussing on current climate variability and by exploring the underlying 
causes and processes that cause vulnerability (an example is Brown & Walker, 2008). In this way, 
they place a greater emphasis on adaptive capacity rather than exposure in assessing vulnerability 
and try to avoid seeing vulnerability as an inevitability of certain socio-economic characteristics 
(Spiers, 2000). Bottom-up approaches are more likely to incorporate peoples’ own perception of 
vulnerability and attitudes towards risk, which may ultimately be more important than exposure in 
determining who adapts and who suffers during climate events. A dis-advantage of bottom-up 
assessments is that they are resource intensive and generally only apply to specific local areas. A 
number of qualitative, mostly bottom-up, studies on the social nature of vulnerability to climate 
change are referred to below.  
The UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 
The UK has generally been considered a forerunner in adaptation2. In 2008 the UK parliament passed 
the Climate Change Act which, among other things, created a duty to conduct a Climate Change Risk 
Assessment (CCRA) every 5 years. The first CCRA was laid before parliament in January 2012, with an 
accompanying report on the economics of climate resilience (ECR) due to be finished in 2013. The 
reports will play an important role in influencing the UK National Adaptation Programme, due to be 
published in 2013. 
The CCRA includes features of both a top-down impacts-based and objective-based risk assessment. 
It takes as its starting point a list of over 700 impacts, identified after considering climate projections, 
reviewing existing evidence and following stakeholder consultation processes. This long list of 
impacts was reduced to around 100 key risks, using a methodology that considered the magnitude of 
the impact and the level of confidence associated with the evidence (HR Wallingford, 2010). The 
CCRA aims to identify all climate risks to the UK, but also considers risks in light of key government 
objectives, not least as the result of risk identification processes that consider Departmental 
Adaptation Plans, which themselves look at key departmental policies when identifying climate risks 
(HR Wallingford, 2010). 
The CCRA is based on a series of twelve sectoral assessments3, each of which is led by a separate 
sector expert and team. This has implications for the way in which social issues are captured – or 
missed – in the assessment. Many if not all of these twelve sectors can be relevant to social justice 
and inequality in some way (e.g. built environment, floods and coastal erosion, health and water are 
perhaps most relevant). However, by taking a sector approach, there is a danger that impacts are 
considered in terms of their affect on the functioning of the sectoral system and not on the lives of 
people affected by that system (e.g. focus on the number of people suffering from heat stress, rather 
than which people in society are likely to suffer harm as a result of heat stress).  
Another key feature of the CCRA – and the ECR report – is that they are both based on existing 
evidence. The majority of climate change research, particularly quantitative analyses, has taken place 
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within physical and natural sciences. CCRA and ECR results are therefore likely to be skewed by the 
available evidence4 and may under-estimate the social nature of vulnerability and risk.  
As well as under-estimating the social nature of risk, the scope of the CCRA was limited to impacts 
within the UK, although as recent evidence suggests, indirect impacts on the UK resulting from 
climate change elsewhere in the world may be as significant, if not more so, than direct impacts at 
home (Foresight, 2011). In particular, of the indirect impacts identified in the Foresight report, 
health, security and migration impacts may affect some groups in society more fundamentally than 
others. 
The CCRA is the first national assessment of its kind and embodies the proactive approach to 
adaptation policy being taken in the UK. However, for various methodological reasons, not least the 
reliance on existing evidence, the first iteration of the CCRA may under-value the social nature of 
climate impacts, risks and vulnerability.  
The problem identified by this paper is therefore that adaptation policies, which are most commonly 
based on top-down assessment, may in some cases fail to protect the most vulnerable people in 
society.  
Social justice and climate change 
Recognising this possibility, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF), a social policy research and 
development charity in the UK, initiated a research programme on Climate Change and Social 
Justice5.  The JRF programme has funded various projects to improve the evidence base on the links 
between social justice and climate change mitigation and adaptation. This section briefly reviews the 
results of a selection of projects from first phase of that programme. Below is a paraphrase of the 
research questions posed by these projects: 
 Who emits the most? 
 Who is most vulnerable to climate impacts? 
 Does adaptation protect the most vulnerable? 
Who emits the most? 
There is a strong correlation between household income and household emissions. A quantitative 
study by Fahmy et al, (2011) explored the nature of this link by compiling a new dataset that 
combines information on household income, consumption of household fuels, private road travel, 
public transport use and domestic and international aviation. The report provides new insights into 
who is responsible for emitting how much carbon dioxide and identifies the relative contributions of 
different aspects of consumption to household carbon emissions (Fahmy et al, 2011). The graph 
below shows the breakdown of different emissions types and total emissions for different household 
income deciles in Great Britain.  
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Figure 1 Mean annual total CO2 emissions from all sources by equivalised household income decile (metric tons) (Source: 
Fahmy et al, 2011:7) 
The relationship between emissions and income is clear. Higher income households emit more; lower 
income groups emit the least. This observation may imply a level of injustice, if it is the case that 
lower emitting groups are also more vulnerable to the climate impacts caused by greenhouse gas 
emissions, as argued below. Fahmy et al go on to use this database of household emissions to 
analyse the social impacts of mitigation policies, which in some cases have important negative 
implications for social justice.  
Who is most vulnerable? 
Climate impacts will vary between climatic zones and local areas in the UK (CCRA, 2012). However, 
the harm (or opportunities) that will result from these changes in climate will also vary between 
social groups within and across different localities. Furthermore, different climate impacts will affect 
groups differently.  
The current evidence base on the social distribution of climate impacts and vulnerability is generally 
poor. Studies have looked at the relationship between impacts such as heat and mortality (e.g. Basu 
& Samet, 2002; Hajat et al, 2007; Mirabelli, 2005), sometimes with a social analysis of the results. 
Literature from the US, drawing on the rich vein of environmental justice in that country, has 
analysed the impact of extreme weather such as heatwaves from a social perspective, for example to 
analyse the distribution of harm (again, usually mortality) across different ethnic groups (e.g. 
Klinenburg, 2002; O’Neill et al, 2005; Morello-Forsch et al 2009), as well as other social effects 
associated with heatwaves, including stress, social disruption, violence and increased crime levels 
(Simister & Cooper, 2004). Recently, similarly social-based analyses of heat have begun to emerge in 
the UK (e.g. Brown & Walker, 2008; Wolf et al, 2009). 
Following the environmental justice angle, in the UK, where flooding has been a more traditional 
impact, a small number of studies have looked explicitly at flood vulnerability and environmental 
inequalities (e.g. Tapsell et al, 2002; Thrush et al, 2005; Fielding et al, 2005; Walker et al, 2006) with a 
specific Environment Agency research programme focussing on the social aspects of flood 
management published in 2005 (EA, 2005). This literature did not explicitly focus on flooding in the 
context of climate change or changes in future risk, however. 
More specific research on the social processes that drive vulnerability is not yet widespread. A 
SNIFFER6 report in 2009 gave an overview of many of the social issues that are relevant to climate 
change and identified gaps in research (CAG Consultants, 2009). The JRF Climate Change and Social 
Justice programme represents the first effort since this report to strategically improve the evidence 
base and communicate issues directly to policy makers and wider stakeholders. 
Below, three recent studies from the JRF programme are reviewed, each looking at different but 
overlapping aspects of social vulnerability to climate change, namely: Zsamboky et al (2011) on the 
impacts of climate change on disadvantaged coastal communities, Benzie et al (2011) on vulnerability 
to heatwaves and drought and Lindley et al (2011) on climate change, justice and vulnerability. Table 
1 below provides an overview of the socially contextual factors that determine vulnerability to 
climate change, drawing on these three projects.  
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Impacts 
considered 
Coastal flooding, heatwave Heatwave, drought Inland flooding, heatwave 
Methods  Community-level focus groups, 
literature review 





Existing health conditions 
Self-perceptions of vulnerability  
Household resources (poverty) 
Livelihoods – particularly where 
related directly to the coast 
Reliance on coastal 
infrastructure 
Housing quality 
Geographical isolation – e.g. 
island communities 
‘Blighted’ neighbourhoods – 
e.g. stigma or crash in property 
values related to perceived 
climate risks 
Community deprivation – 
including capacity of local 
authorities 
Access to affordable insurance 
Exposure 
Housing quality  
Occupation 
Physical neighbourhood characteristics – including urban 
heat island, green spaces, etc, 




Health and disability – including mental and physical health 
conditions 









Household use of resources (e.g. water use) 
Income 
Lifestyle flexibility – including alternative employment and 
leisure options 
Social capital and community cohesion 
Access to social networks 
Access to political power and representation 
Institutional jurisdiction – e.g. quality of local health 








Housing tenure  
Occupation 
Transience – including tourists, travellers, homeless 





Physical attributes of neighbourhood – including green 
space, urban heat island, overcrowding 





Social characteristics of neighbourhood – including 
isolation, fear of crime, public cool spaces, inequality, trust, 
unemployment, population turnover 
Institutional regimes  – e.g. nursing homes, loss of 
individual autonomy 
Local authority resources 
Experience of previous extreme weather event(s) 
Access to social/ health services 
Table 1 Overview of socially contextual factors that determine vulnerability to climate change 
Coastal vulnerability 
Zsamboky et al (2011) looked at the impacts of climate change on disadvantaged coastal 
communities. They found a strong social dimension to the exposure of people to coastal flood risk, 
but also a number of links between deprivation and the ability of households and communities to 
respond to flood events and adapt to future threats.  
Coastal communities in the UK tend to be characterised by high levels of youth out-migration and a 
corresponding in-migration and concentration of older people, as well as transient groups (including 
tourists), who are identified as being most sensitive to climate impacts. Coastal communities are 
particularly vulnerable because of their high reliance on coastal infrastructure, ecosystems and 
communications, which are especially susceptible to damage and disruption from climate impacts, 
namely sea level rise, storm-related damage, coastal erosion and flooding.  
A high economic reliance on seasonal employment related to tourism also heightens the sensitivity 
of coastal communities to extreme weather events and possibly long term climate change (although 
climate change may present opportunities for tourism-related employment as well). Local health, 
social and emergency services are also put under pressure during  the tourism season, reducing the 
capacity of these services to support local populations in the event of extreme events such as 
heatwaves or floods (as well as rendering tourists themselves at higher risk).  
The physical isolation of some coastal communities, particularly those on islands and remote 
coastlines, adds to their vulnerability, as does the generally old and poor quality housing stock and 
below-average income levels associated with deprived coastal communities. The report highlights 
the risk that certain coastal towns and villages become ‘blighted’ by the perception of high risks from 
coastal change and therefore lose property values, job opportunities and investment (and possibly 
even flood defence protection from central government) leading to further social deterioration and 
increased vulnerability. 
Vulnerability to high temperatures 
Benzie et al (2011) examine the concepts of vulnerability and resilience as they are used by the 
climate change community and relate these to the concept of social justice. They find that there is 
likely to be a strong social dimension to climate change vulnerability in the UK. The report focuses on 
the complexity of social vulnerability to high temperatures.  
In the UK, vulnerability to high temperatures has previously been understood as a function of health 
and a matter for the health service (DoH, 2010). Whilst accurate, this physiological focus on 
sensitivity fails to account for the social processes and social context that determine who is able to 
anticipate, cope with and adapt in order to avoid harm during heatwaves.  
There are spatial patterns to the distribution of vulnerability to high temperatures, for example 
urban residents are more exposed (Hajat et al, 2007) and within towns and cities it is often deprived 
areas that are most likely to be located within the centre of urban heat islands (UHIs). Deprived inner 
city communities are also less likely to have close access to cool spaces such as green parks, gardens 
or woodlands. Social factors are also important determinants of vulnerability, although research in 
this area is generally lacking.  
Social cohesion at the community level, including ethic or faith-based communities that span 
different urban neighbourhoods, can help to identify vulnerable people and offer support during 
heatwaves; such informal networks often replace official medical or social services, particularly 
where population turnover is high and trust between social groups and official services is low, as in 
some deprived urban neighbourhoods (Brent Council, 2009). In this respect, the presence of strong 
communities and high social capital may sometimes be higher in some deprived neighbourhoods 
than in some higher income neighbourhoods (e.g. suburban commuter districts).  
Some studies indicate a link between social isolation and mortality during heatwaves (e.g. 
Klinenberg, 2002), whilst others identify stronger links between mortality and residency in care 
homes (e.g. Brown & Walker, 2008). Welfare losses from heat, as opposed to mortality, including 
discomfort, distress, morbidity, violence and social unrest, have received much less attention in the 
literature, but may also be concentrated in deprived inner city areas (Benzie et al, 2011). Studies 
have found links between ethnicity and vulnerability to heat (e.g. Basu & Samet, 2002; Morello-
Frosch et al, 2009), depending on non-physiological factors such as employment (Mirabelli, 2005), 
education and air conditioning (O’Neill et al, 2005).  
Many studies find a link between age and vulnerability to high temperatures (e.g. Fouillet et al, 
2006), but it is also important to note the role of risk perception among all groups (Grothman & Patt, 
2005), including older people. Various studies show that people who do not perceive themselves to 
be at risk are less likely to take measures to prevent the effects of heat stress, even when they are in 
fact at high risk (Abrahamson et al, 2008; Wolf et al, 2009).  
One study has looked at the links between employment and climate change vulnerability, uncovering 
an additional social layer of vulnerability whereby peoples’ occupation exposes them to a greater 
level of climate risk, for example lower paid, unskilled jobs (e.g. outdoor manual labourers, train 
drivers or factory workers) are higher risk than higher paid, highly skilled jobs (e.g. those in air 
conditioned offices) (TUC, 2009). 
One key finding of this literature is that vulnerability to climate events is highly dependent on local 
context and that a better account of individuals’ and groups’ adaptive capacity is needed to 
understand the social nature of vulnerability in each case (e.g. Brown & Walker, 2008). 
A socio-spatial index of vulnerability 
Lindley et al (2011) identify the determinants of vulnerability to heatwaves and floods and use these 
to develop a spatially explicit index of vulnerability that accounts for the social nature of exposure 
and adaptive capacity. The results constitute the first quantitative representation of the potential for 
future losses in well being that take explicit account of the social nature of vulnerability. Figure 2 
below shows the results of the index for flood vulnerability in England. In total 8% of English 
neighbourhoods are estimate to have extremely high flood-related social vulnerability, with a strong 
concentration of vulnerability in deprived urban and coastal areas (38% of the areas are within 2km 
of the coast). These areas are represented as having low capacities to prepare, respond and recover 
from flood events, according to the index. The specific variables that influence the distribution of 
social flood vulnerability shown in this map include: lack of gardens and green space (which help to 
regulate run-off flows); a proxy measure of insurance availability – based on current flood 
probabilities; low income; poor knowledge; and, low mobility.  
 
 
Figure 2 Socio-spatial flood vulnerability in England (source: Lindley et al, 2011) 
A similar index has been produced for social vulnerability to heat (see Figure 3 below). A similar 
proportion of neighbourhoods are estimated to have extremely high social vulnerability to heat as to 
flooding: 9% in this case. Again, there is a strong urban dimension to the results, particularly in 
London which has three times the mean level of heat vulnerability compared to other regions and 
40% of all of the extremely vulnerable neighbourhoods in England. Interesting detail emerges in the 
disaggregated results, which show a low capacity to respond to high temperature events in remote 
rural areas that are isolated from medical services, for example. There is also a strong coastal 
component, which is influenced by the adaptive capacity indicators rather than the signal of 
increased exposure from higher temperatures, underlying the dominantly social nature of 
vulnerability to climate change.  
 
 
Figure 3  Socio-spatial heat vulnerability in England (source: Lindley et al, 2011) 
 
Taken together, the two aggregate indices of social vulnerability show the significant overlap 
between vulnerable neighbourhoods to multiple climate impacts; fully 64% of the extremely socially 
vulnerable neighbourhoods to flooding are also classified as extremely vulnerable to heat. This has 
significant implications for the design of adaptation strategies; if the same social groups tend to be 
vulnerable to multiple climate impacts then a key element of adaptation strategy should be to 
protect and build resilience among these most vulnerable groups. 
Does adaptation protect the most vulnerable? 
Adaptation implementation is in its early phases in the UK. Despite a growing body of research and 
an improved level of awareness among decision makers of the need to adapt, specific adaptation 
actions are few and difficult to identify (ASC, 2011).  Nevertheless, the JRF programme has 
undertaken some case study work to assess emerging lessons on whether adaptation offers 
protection to the most vulnerable.  
Planned vs. autonomous adaptation 
Adaptation can either be planned (usually by a national or local government) or autonomous (i.e. 
undertaken by private actors in response to their own calculation of costs and benefits) (Smit & 
Pilifosova, 2001). Planned adaptation should be carefully considered; the scope for considering social 
justice issues should be high. Autonomous adaptation may occur within narrower contexts and the 
potential for mal-adaptation may be higher. Mal-adaptation is generally understood as those actions 
taken ostensibly to avoid or reduce vulnerability to climate change that impact adversely on, or even 
increase the vulnerability of, other systems, sectors or social groups (Barnett & O’Neill, 2009). 
Below two examples of autonomous adaptation (water pricing and flood insurance) and one example 
of planned adaptation (heatwave planning) are considered through a social justice lens. 
Improving water efficiency in response to drought risk 
The south west of England is projected to become much drier as a result of climate change, 
particularly in the summer, with extreme scenarios suggesting up to 50% or 70% less rainfall 
(UKCP09). This region also happens to have the fastest growing population in the UK (ONS, 2003) 
with the number of households projected to increase by 36% by 2030 (DCLG, 2009). The south west 
is also one of the most popular tourism destinations in England, with over 21 million visits per year – 
a figure that is also projected to rise as a result of changing patterns in the tourism industry but also 
in response to the impacts of climate change elsewhere in Europe (EEA, 2008). Improving water 
efficiency is therefore a priority for South West Water, the company that manages and delivers water 
services in the region.  
However, water affordability is already a serious issue in the south west, where prices are around  
40% higher than in other regions of the UK, due to a mixture of legacy, infrastructure and tourism 
factors. Delivering affordable water efficiency is therefore the additional challenge in the south west 
of England.  
Benzie et al (2011) examined a pilot project by South West Water to introduce a Rising Block Tariff 
for water customers. In theory, this tariff structure incentivises water efficiency whilst delivering 
affordable water to all. It offers three differently priced ‘blocks’ of water use: 
 Block 1: ‘essential use’ at 73% of the standard unit price 
 Block 2: standard price (a buffer) 
 Block 3: ‘premium use’ at 181% of the standard unit price 
The theory is that users who reduce their use are rewarded with cheaper water and those that chose 
to use more pay a premium for doing so. The system relies on their being a free and equal choice 
between households on how much water they use. The Benzie et al case study demonstrated that 
water use requirements differ between households; some households have a lower ability to reduce 
their water use, as a result of household size, certain medical requirements or even as a result of 
tenure and inflexibility to fit water-saving devices or inability to purchase water-efficient 
technologies (e.g. new washing machines). Such households, if on low incomes, may be unfairly 
penalised by the introduction of a Rising Block Tariff system, raising the prospect that water 
efficiency schemes could push more households into a situation of ‘water poverty’ (defined as 
spending more than 3% of disposable income on water bills, after Fitch & Price, 2002).  
The case study also revealed the role of support schemes that protect low income households from 
water poverty where metering and new tariff structures are in place. In the south west, the 
WaterSure scheme caps bills for qualifying households (those on low incomes or with defined 
medical requirements) and the WaterCare scheme aims to improve water efficiency and provide 
support to households in debt with water companies. Thus, efficiency incentive schemes, including 
water metering and new tariff structures, are not inherently regressive and do provide the potential 
to address climate risks (i.e. drought) in socially just ways, provided that they are always 
implemented in tandem with support schemes for vulnerable households. Benzie et al (2011) and the 
independent Walker Review of affordability and water charging (Walker, 2009) identify various 
features of the water sector that are important for maintaining affordability and make various 
recommendations to ensure that water poverty is avoided as a mal-adaptation to climate change.  
In this case, autonomous adaptation (i.e. using pricing mechanisms to address resource scarcity and 
reduce risks) only avoids being un-just because consumer rights are well represented in the water 
sector and the industry is heavily regulated by the UK government.  
Future flood insurance 
Flood insurance in the UK is currently governed by an agreement between the state and the 
insurance sector (the most recent incarnation of which is known as the ‘Statement of Principles’). In 
short: the state commits to provide flood defences and prevent development in very high risk areas 
in return for a commitment from insurers to provide insurance cover to all households and most 
small businesses (see Crichton, 2002). This agreement is due to expire in 2013, stimulating a lively 
debate between insurers, the government and various stakeholders on what should replace it. The 
JRF recently published a ‘viewpoint’ report that addresses the social justice aspects of this debate 
(O’Neill & O’Neill, 2012).  
One in six homes in England is currently at risk from flooding (EA, 2009) and low income households 
are the most likely to be uninsured and the least able to recover from the financial impacts of 
flooding (Pitt, 2008). Flood risk is increasing in the UK as a result of increased development and 
climate change. Looking into the future, there is a tension between creating disincentives to live and 
develop in flood zones and penalising people who already live in flood zones. If the insurance market 
was left to adapt autonomously by simply pricing the actual risk for each household, insurance prices 
would drive demand for housing in low risk zones (and therefore raise property values), whilst high 
risk areas would become cheap (attracting low income households), ‘blighted’ and potentially un-
insured or un-insurable, creating significant inequalities and social injustice (O’Neill & O’Neill, 2012). 
 Alternative (non-market) insurance models exist and are common in other European countries, 
where the state often plays a larger role. O’Neill & O’Neill (2012) explain how different concepts of 
fairness imply different insurance models and argue strongly for a more solidaristic flood insurance 
regime in the UK. The case of flood insurance, as an example of autonomous adaptation where risk is 
priced, shows the inability of some forms of adaptation to protect the most vulnerable and a much 
more worrying possibility that mal-adaptation may significantly increase the vulnerability of some 
groups to climate change.  
The Heatwave Plan  
Temperatures in the south of England are projected to increase significantly over coming decades, 
with extreme heatwave events in particular likely to cause significant harm and economic damage 
(Stott et al, 2004, Metroeconomica, 2006). Demographic trends in parts of England, particularly the 
south west, are likely to increase the population’s vulnerability to high temperatures, largely as a 
result of increases in the number of older people (the proportion of whom is projected to rise from 
22.5% - already above average – to 29% by 2031) and increased numbers of tourists. 
The only current strategy for explicitly managing risks relating to high temperatures in the UK is the 
Heatwave Plan for England and Wales, led by the Department of Health. The existence of the 
strategy is in part a reaction to the unforeseen impacts of the 2003 heatwave in Europe, which led to 
the premature deaths of around 2,000 people in the UK (Metroeconomica, 2006) in addition to 
30,000 deaths and billions of Euros’ worth of damage across mainland Europe (COPA-COGECA, 2003).  
The Heatwave Plan relies on various tiers of governance to ‘cascade’ down responsibilities during 
heatwave events. Different Levels of alert are defined within the plan and triggered once weather 
forecasts exceed certain thresholds (see DoH, 2010; DoH 2011, for details).   
Benzie et al (2011) interviewed various ‘responsible authorities’ under the Heatwave Plan and other 
relevant stakeholders in order to examine their understanding of ‘vulnerability to high temperatures’ 
and to see how the concept of vulnerability was operationalised in practice. Unsurprisingly, given the 
complexity and lack of an evidence base identifying vulnerable people (alluded to above), there is 
some confusion and an oversimplification of vulnerability in practice (which tends to revert to health-
based definitions of vulnerability). This tends to ignore the social processes that determine 
vulnerability and therefore misses opportunities to build resilience to high temperatures, rather than 
merely to respond during emergency situations. In many cases it is unlikely that the most vulnerable 
people will receive support during heatwave events, largely because health services are not able to 
identify who is most vulnerable.  
The case study found that resources for implementing the Heatwave Plan were severely limited and 
responsibility to implement the plan fell mostly on emergency planning departments within local 
government and health care professionals. This precludes the potentially crucial role of local 
stakeholders who benefit from a more detailed understanding of vulnerability and climate change, 
including social services, climate change partnerships, researchers and, in particular, community 
groups. The role of stakeholders who have the ability to help build resilience to high temperatures, 
for example spatial planners and educators, is not yet a feature of Heatwave Plan implementation, 
according to Benzie et al. However, a key recommendation in the report is to go beyond the 
Heatwave Plan (which is understandably focussed mostly on health and emergency response, given 
its remit) to take a much more proactive and integrated approach to build resilience to high 
temperatures in the UK in ways that explicitly promote social justice and equity.  
Conclusion  
The cases presented above highlight the social nature of vulnerability and the uneven distribution of 
vulnerability to climate change. They also highlight the potential for mal-adaptation to increase 
certain groups’ vulnerability (especially autonomous mal-adaptation) and the uneven and uncertain 
benefits that adaptation might bring to certain social groups in the UK.  
In conclusion, it is possible to identify a ‘quadruple injustice’ to climate change within the UK; certain 
disadvantaged groups, including those on low incomes, social marginalised and older people: 
 Emit the least 
 May be negatively impacted by mitigation policies 
 Are most vulnerable to climate impacts 
 May be negatively impacted by adaptation policies 
This presents a particular set of challenges to adaptation decision makers.  
First, it raises questions of procedural justice. How can the voices of the most vulnerable be heard in 
the design and implementation of adaptation policies? It has been shown that the implementation of 
the Heatwave Plan in England and Wales has so far failed to involve vulnerable groups, or 
organisations that represent vulnerable groups, in the process of identifying who is vulnerable or in 
delivering emergency response services during heatwave events. However, the involvement of the 
Consumer Council for Water in the RBT trial in the south west of England is evidence of a more just 
decision making procedure, which also happens to result in a more ‘just’ outcome (Benzie et al, 
2011). Given the complexities involved in adaptation policy design, including the treatment of 
complex and uncertain science and the normative choices relating to risks that characterise 
adaptation, it is both difficult and yet essential that vulnerable groups are brought into adaptation 
decision making. 
Second, questions of substantive justice have been raised, particularly with respect to autonomous 
adaptation and most of all where market forces are employed to deliver efficient adaptation 
outcomes, whether these are in the pricing of risk (via free market insurance models) or via scarcity 
and price signals (via water metering).  
Third, there is the potential for adaptation to enhance social justice, although this has not been the 
focus of attention in this paper. Adaptation measures, for example the creation of sustainable urban 
landscapes that offer free, cool public spaces and reduce flood risks, could improve the quality of life 
for residents and facilitate more cohesive community living spaces. 
Discussion 
Methods 
This paper began with a brief review of methodologies used to inform adaptation decision making. 
This analysis has implications for the governance of adaptation. On one level, over-reliance on top-
down assessment techniques may tend to ‘hide’ the social nature of vulnerability and lead to 
adaptation strategies that fail to protect the most vulnerable. This would be the consequence of 
focussing on the size of a risk, or its aggregate costs, rather than on the social nature of the risk: who 
will suffer harm as a result of that risk.  
As has been seen from the case studies, vulnerability to multiple climate impacts tends to overlap for 
certain social groups, namely those with low adaptive capacity, who tend to be marginalised and 
disadvantaged in society currently. The implications of this for adaptation governance are that more 
bottom-up analyses should be used to inform adaptation policy, incorporating procedural elements, 
such as more consultation with vulnerable groups, as well as methodological elements that base 
climate risk assessment more on current climate vulnerability and that focus more on identifying 
cross-cutting issues from different sectors.  
The UK Climate Change Risk Assessment provides an interesting case. Whilst initially designed as an 
impacts-based risk assessment, the CCRA methodology was modified to better account for the social 
aspects of risks, perhaps in response to the evidence generated and put forward by the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation. The CCRA methodology now includes a stage (step 5) to explicitly consider 
equity issues and social vulnerability. Within this stage, broad clusters of risks have been assessed 
using a Social Vulnerability Checklist (HR Wallingford, 2010). An evidence review report on social 
vulnerability to climate change impacts (CEP, 2011) was also prepared as part of the CCRA process to 
inform decision makers (though this has not yet been made public). Step 7 of the CCRA methodology, 
which develops risk metrics for each risk, also provides the opportunity to develop social metrics that 
can be used to measure changes in risks relevant to social justice (e.g. changes in the number of 
deprived households at risk from flooding, see HR Wallingford, 2010). In these ways, the social 
nature of vulnerability is recognised in the CCRA and attempts have been made to update the 
methodology to better account for social vulnerability. Top-down assessments can therefore be 
carried out ways that do draw attention to the social nature of vulnerability and risk, although 
current evidence gaps make this difficult in practice. 
Governance 
The quadruple injustice of climate change challenges adaptation governance to become more just 
and to deliver more just outcomes. Below, the concept of a new policy concept to transfer funds 
between high emitters and the vulnerable is introduced, based on the logic of the quadruple 
injustice. 
Public attitudes to fairness represent a barrier but also an opportunity for designing new, socially-
accepted climate change policies. Another report from the JRF Climate Change and Social Justice 
programme (Horton & Doran, 211) used focus groups to look at peoples’ sense of fairness in relation 
to behaviours and rules governing climate change. For example, they looked at collective antipathy 
towards ‘freeriding’ behaviour and public support for rules to prevent excessive consumption 
(specifically in situations of ‘resource scarcity’, such as climate change7). The report concludes that 
climate change regulations do not need to appeal solely to self-interest and cost-saving opportunities 
– as many regulations and policy initiatives currently do -  but that regulations may be more 
successful if they appeal to peoples’ sense of fairness, based on the link between excessive 
consumption (i.e. emissions) and climate change  (Horton & Doran, 2011). Whilst the focus groups 
did not explicitly ask people about their sense of fairness in relation to adaptation, the results 
present an interesting question: could peoples’ sense of fairness be harnessed to address the 
quadruple injustice of climate change by transferring resources from high emitters to the most 
vulnerable? 
The logic behind this question is that a clear line of scientific causality can be made between 
excessive consumption (e.g. driving a high-emitting SUV or frequent flying), physical climate change 
and impacts on vulnerable people (e.g. flooding a family living on low-income in an un-insured 
                                                          
7
 Climate change can be understood as a resource scarcity issue in terms of the atmosphere’s limited capacity 
to absorb greenhouse gases, the report argues. Resource scarcity is a one framing of problems that is likely to 
elicit feelings of cooperation and un-fairness in public attitudes.  
house). Whilst it is unlikely that an acceptable scheme could be designed for direct payments 
between emitters and vulnerable groups, there may be public support for policies that use revenues 
from taxes on high emitting behaviour to compensate vulnerable groups, or preferably  to invest in 
building resilience among vulnerable people. This, after all, is the logic applied to global negotiations 
on climate change, where developed countries have agreed to transfer significant funds to help the 
most vulnerable countries adapt as a result of historic emissions8, via the Green Climate Fund and 
Adaptation Fund. Public awareness of climate change, vulnerability and adaptation would need to 
improve significantly before the fairness aspects of such a policy could be widely understood and 
accepted, but perhaps one day similar mechanisms could be applied within countries to fund 
investment in socially just adaptation.  
Summary  
This paper has briefly reviewed the dominant methods used to inform adaptation policy, which are 
generally top-down, impacts-based approaches. Adaptation based on these assessments may fail to 
protect the most vulnerable groups in society. Mal-adaptation, particularly where market forces are 
relied upon to increase resource efficiency or to price risk, may have particularly un-just outcomes. 
Top-down assessments can, however, be carried out in ways that draw attention to the social nature 
of vulnerability, as the UK CCRA demonstrates. However, better evidence on the social distribution of 
vulnerability to climate change and on the social impact of planned and autonomous adaptation is 
needed, including more bottom-up vulnerability analysis at the local level. The paper finishes by 
suggesting an appeal to the public’s sense of fairness to support new policies that transfer funds 
from high emitters to invest in resilience building for vulnerable groups. More research and improved 
public awareness about climate change adaptation is needed.  
                                                          
8
 The historical nature of these emissions are pertinent to the global debate, but problematic when applied to 
transfers between emitters and the vulnerable from within current generations (e.g. an individual may 
question the credibility of claims for compensation between members of the same generation when current 
climate impacts are the result of emissions more than 20 or 30 years in the past). This paper does not set out to 
explore this concept in detail, though a discussion on these issues would be welcome.  
References 
Abrahamson, V., Wolf, J., Lorenzoni, I., Fenn, B., Kovats, S., Wilkinson, P., Adger, N. W. & Raine, R. 
(2008) Perceptions of heatwave risks to health: interview-based study of older people in London and 
Norwich, UK, Journal of Public Health, 31(1), pp. 119–26. 
Ackerman, F. (2009) The Stern Review vs. its Critics: Which Side is Less Wrong?, Stockholm 
Environment Institute-US Center, Tufts University, for Economics for Equity and the Environment 
Network 
Adaptation Sub-Committee (ASC) (2011) Adapting to climate change in the UK: Measuring progress, 
United Kingdom: Adaptation Sub-Committee 
Adger, W.N., Arnell, N.W. & Tompkins, E.L. (2005) Successful adaptation to climate change across 
scales, Global Environmental Change Vol. 15, pp.77-85 
Barnett, J. & O’Neill, S. (2010) Editorial: Mal-adaptation, Global Environmental Change 20 (2010) 
211–213 
Basu, R. & Samet, J. (2002) Relation between elevated ambient temperature and mortality: a review 
of the epidemiologic evidence, Epidemiologic Reviews, 24(2), p. 190. 
Benzie, M., Harvey, A., Burningham, K., Hodgson, N. & Siddiqi, A. (2011) Vulnerability to heatwaves 
and drought Case studies of adaptation to climate change in south-west England, Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation; York. 
Blake, P., Cannon, T., Davis, I. & Wisner, B. (1994) At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability 
and Disasters. London: Routledge. 
Bradbury, J. (1989) The policy implications of differing concepts of risk, Science, Technology and 
Human Values, Vol. 14 (4), pp.380-399 




Brown, A., Gawith, M., Lonsdale, K. & Pringle, P. (2011) Managing adaptation: linking theory and 
practice. UK Climate Impacts Programme, Oxford, UK. 
Brown, S. & Walker, G. (2008) Understanding heatwave vulnerability in nursing and residential 
homes, Building Research & Information, 36(4), pp. 363–72. 
CAG Consultants (2009) Differential Social Impacts of Climate Change in the UK, SNIFFER report 
UKCC22. 
Collingwood Environmental Planning (CEP) (2011) Social Vulnerability to Climate Change Impacts: An 
evidence review undertaken as part of the UK Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA)(unpublished) 
COPA COGECA (2003) Assessment of the Impact of the Heatwave and Drought of the Summer 2003 
on Agriculture and Forestry, available at: http://www.meteo.uni-
koeln.de/content/forschung/klimadiagnose/summerheat2003/pocc_03_78i4_1e.pdf [ 
Crichton, D. (2002) UK and Global Insurance Responses to Flood Hazard, Water International 27, 
pp.119–131 
DCLG (2009) Household Projections to 2031, England, Department for Communities and Local 
Government, available at: http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/statistics/pdf/1172133.pdf 
Department of Health (DoH) (2010) Heatwave Plan for England: Protecting Health and Reducing 
Harm from Extreme Heat and Heatwaves, Department of Health, available at: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalass
et/dh_116029.pdf 
Department of Health (DoH) (2011) Heatwave Plan for England: Protecting Health and Reducing 
Harm from Extreme Heat and Heatwaves, Department of Health, available at: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/documents/digitalasset/dh_1272
35.pdf 
Dessai, S. & Hulme, M. (2004) Does climate adaptation policy need probabilities?, Climate Policy, 
4(2), pp. 107–28. 
Environment Agency (EA) (2005) Managing the social aspects of flooding: Synthesis Report, Joint 
Defra / Environment Agency Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management R&D Programme, R&D 
Technical Report SC040033/SR6 
Environment Agency (EA) (2009) Flooding in England: A National Assessment of Flood Risk 
European Environment Agency (EEA) (2008) Impacts of Europe’s Changing Climate: 2008 Indicator-
based Assessment. Copenhagen: European Environment Agency, available at: 
http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/eea_report_2008_4/ 
Fahmy, E., Thumim, J. & White, V. (2011) The distribution of UK household CO2 emissions Interim 
Report, Joseph Rowntree Foundation; York 
Fielding, J., Gray, K., Burningham, K. & Thrush, D. (2005) Flood warning for vulnerable groups: 
secondary analysis of flood data, Environment Agency R&D Report, W5C-018/2 Bristol.  
Foresight (2011) Foresight International Dimensions of Climate Change, Final Project Report, The 
Government Office for Science, London 
Fouillet, A., Rey, G., Laurent, F., Pavillon, G., Bellec, S., Guihenneuc-Jouyaux, C., Clavel, J., Jougla, E. & 
Hemon, D. (2006) Excess mortality related to the August 2003 heatwave in France, International 
Archives of Occupational and Environmental Health, 80, pp. 16–24. 
Goldspink, C. (2000) Modelling social systems as complex: Towards a social simulation meta-model, 
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation vol. 3(2) 
Grothmann, T. & Patt, A. (2005) Adaptive capacity and human cognition: the process of individual 
adaptation to climate change, Global Environmental Change, 15, pp. 199–213. 
Hajat, S., Kovats, R. & Lachowycz, K. (2007) Heat-related and cold-related deaths in England and 
Wales: who is at risk? Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 64, pp. 93–100 
Hoffmann, P., Hrueger, O. & Schluenze, K.H. (2011) A statistical model for the urban heat island and 
its application to a climate change scenario, International Journal of Climatology, DOI: 
10.1002/joc.2348 
Horton, T. & Doran, N. (2011) Climate change and sustainable consumption: What do the public 
think is fair? Joseph Rowntree Foundation; York 
HR Wallingford (2010) Method for undertaking the CCRA Part II – Detailed Method for Stage 3: 
Assess Risk  Project deliverable number D.2.1.1 
HR Wallingford (2012) The UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 2012 Evidence Report, Project 
deliverable number D.4.2.1, January 2012 
Institute of Risk Management (2002) A Risk Management Standard, with AIRMIC and ALARM, 
available at: http://www.theirm.org/publications/documents/ARMS_2002_IRM.pdf   
IPCC (2007) Climate Change: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, Contribution of Working Group 
II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Parry, M. L., 
Canziani, O. F., Palutikof, J. P., van der Linden, P. J. and Hanson, C. E. (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Jones, R.N. & Preston, B.L. (2010) Adaptation and risk management. Climate Change Working Paper 
No. 15, Centre for Strategic Economic Studies, Victoria University, Melbourne, 18 pp. 
Kelly, P. M. & Adger, W. N. (2000) Theory and practice in assessing vulnerability to climate change 
and facilitating adaptation, Climatic Change, 47, pp. 325–52. 
Klinenberg, E. (2002) Heat Wave: A Social Autopsy of Disaster in Chicago. Chicago IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Lindley, S., O’Neill, J., Kandeh, J., Lawson, N., Christian, R. & O’Neill, M. (2011) Climate change, 
justice and vulnerability, Joseph Rowntree Foundation; York 
Metroeconomica (2006) Task 2: Report on the Costs of the Hot Summer of 2003, Climate change 
impacts and adaptation: cross-regional research programme. Project E: Quantify the cost of impacts 
and adaptation  http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=GA01075_4036_FRP.pdf 
Mirabelli, M. C. (2005) Heat-related fatalities in North Carolina, American Journal of Public Health, 
95(4), pp. 635–7. 
Morello-Frosch, R., Pastor, M., Sadd, J. & Shonkoff, S. (2009) The Climate Gap: Inequalities in How 
Climate Change Hurts Americans and How to Close the Gap, Program for Environmental and 
Regional Equality (PERE), University of Southern California, available at: 
http://college.usc.edu/geography/ESPE/perepub.html 
O’Brien, K., Eriksen, S., Schjolden, A., Nygaard, L. P. (2007) Why different interpretations of 
vulnerability matter in climate change discourses, Climate Policy, 7(1), pp. 73–88. 
O’Neill, J. & O’Neill, M. (2012) Social justice and the future of flood insurance, JRF Viewpoint report, 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation; York 
O’Neill, M. S., Zanobetti, A. & Schwartz, J. (2005) Disparities by race in heat-related mortality in four 
US cities: the role of air-conditioning prevalence, Journal of Urban Health, 82(2), pp. 191–7. 
Patt, A. G., Schröter, D., de la Vega-Leinert, A. C. and Klein, R. J. T. (2009) Vulnerability research and 
assessment to support adaptation and mitigation: common themes from the diversity of approaches, 
in Patt, A. G., Schröter, D., Klein, R. J. T. and de la Vega-Leinert, A. C. (eds) Assessing Vulnerability to 
Global Environmental Change: Making Research Useful for Adaptation Decision-making and Policy. 
London: Earthscan. 
Pitt, M. (2008) Learning lessons from the 2007 floods, London: Cabinet Office 
Simister, J. & Cooper, C. (2004) Thermal stress in the USA: effects on violence and on employee 
behaviour, Stress and Health (International Society for the Investigation of Stress), 21(1), pp. 3–15. 
Smit, B. & Pilifosova, O. (2001) Chapter 18: Adaptation to Climate Change in the Context of 
Sustainable Development and Equity in IPCC, 2001: Climate change 2001: impacts, adaptation and 
vulnerability, Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited by J. J. McCarthy, O. F. Canziani, N. A. Leary, D. J. 
Dokken & K. S. White (eds). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York, USA, 2001. 
Spiers, J. (2000) New perspectives on vulnerability using emic and etic approaches, Journal of 
Advanced Nursing, 31(3), pp. 715–21. 
Stanton, E. A., Ackerman, F. & Kartha, S. (2009) Inside the integrated assessment models: Four issues 
in climate economics, Climate and Development 1 (2009) 166–184 
Stott, P., Stone, D. A. & Allen, M. R. (2004) Human contribution to the European heatwave of 2003, 
Nature, 432, pp. 610–14. 
Tapsell, S., Penning R. E., Tunstall, S. & Wilson T. L. (2002) Vulnerability to flooding: health and social 
dimensions, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Vol. 360(1796), pp. 1511–25. 
Thrush, D., Burningham, K. & Fielding, J. (2005) Vulnerability with regard to flood warning and flood 
event: a review of the literature, Environment Agency R&D Report, W5c-018/1 Bristol.  
TUC (2009) Changing Work in a Changing Climate: Adaptation to Climate Change in the UK, New 
Research on Implications for Employment. London: Trades Union Congress, available at: 
http://www.tuc.org.uk/extras/adaptation.pdf 
Walker, A. (2009b) The Independent Review of Charging for Household Water and Sewerage 
Services, final report to Defra (December 2009), available at: 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/quality/water/industry/walkerreview/documents/fi nal-
report.htm 
Walker, G., Burningham, K., Fielding, J., Smith, G., Thrush, D. & Fay, H. (2006) Addressing 
environmental inequalities: flood risk, Environment Agency Science Report, SC020061/SR1. 
Watkiss, P (Editor) (2011) The ClimateCost Project. Final Report. Volume 1: Europe. Published by the 
Stockholm Environment Institute, Sweden, 2011. ISBN 978-91-86125-35-6. 
Willows, R. I. & Connell, R. K. (2003) Climate adaptation: risk, uncertainty and decision-making. 
UKCIP technical report. UKCIP, Oxford 
Wolf, J., Adger, W. N., Lorenzoni, I., Abrahamson, V. & Raine, R. (2009) Social capital, individual 
responses to heatwaves and climate change adaptation: an empirical study of two UK cities, Global 
Environmental Change, 20 (2010), pp. 44–52. 
 
